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Between 2003 and 2013, the proportion of California 8th graders enrolled in Algebra or a more 
advanced course nearly doubled to 65 percent. In this paper, we consider the organizational 
processes that accompanied this curricular intensification. Facing a complex set of 
accountability, institutional, technical/functional, and internal political pressures, California 
schools responded to the Algebra-for-all effort in diverse ways. While some schools detracked 
by enrolling all 8th graders in Algebra, others “tracked up,” creating more advanced geometry 
opportunities while increasing algebra enrollments. These responses created a new differentiated 
course structure that is likely to benefit advantaged students. Consistent with the Effectively 
Maintained Inequality hypothesis, we find that detracking occurred primarily in disadvantaged 







Many scholars view the United States’ public education system as an institution that is 
uniquely resistant to change (Tyack & Cuban, 1995; Meyer & Rowan, 1975, 2006; Weick, 
1976). But American schools do change, sometimes in ways that have fundamental implications 
for the technical core of classroom instruction. Consider, for example, the broad array of 
practices that schools use to sort students into instructional groups based on their observed 
achievement, often referred to as “tracking”: In the 1960s and 1970s, the tracking system in the 
United States underwent a major transformation as secondary schools replaced overarching 
academic tracks with a system designed to allow students to opt into tracked courses on a 
subject-by-subject basis (Lucas, 1999). Today, the U.S. school tracking system is in the midst of 
a second major transformation. Over the last 30 years, American middle and high schools have 
undertaken a broad effort to enroll fewer students in low-track courses by requiring students to 
take more challenging ones. This change is particularly noticeable in mathematics, where 
between 1982 and 2004, the proportion of high school graduates completing at least 
Trigonometry increased from 24 percent to 57 percent (Domina & Saldana, 2012).  
Since course placements are closely associated with student achievement growth 
(Adelman, 1999; Domina, Penner, Penner, & Conley, 2014; Long, Conger, & Iatarola, 2012), 
changes to academic tracking systems have the potential to equalize key inequalities within 
American schools. As schools move students out of low-track courses, one might expect gaps in 
high-level course completion to narrow as academic course structures become less differentiated. 
However, recent changes to the tracking system may have only partially realized that potential, 
narrowing inequalities in middle-track courses without changing inequalities in the highest tracks 





Given these cross-cutting trends, this paper investigates how and where tracking systems 
change. Research on detracking highlights that these changes are local and contentious. Yet we 
have relatively little systematic knowledge about how the recent wave of curricular 
intensification has played out across different schools. Our analyses focus on one particularly 
rapid recent change in secondary school tracking systems: the Algebra-for-all effort that doubled 
8th grade algebra enrollment rates in California middle schools between 2003 and 2013. Given 
ambiguous messages in the state’s call for expanding 8th grade Algebra, California middle 
schools chose among three distinct strategies: (1) Ignoring policy pressures and maintaining the 
status quo, (2) fundamentally detracking student course assignments and enrolling nearly all 
students in academically equivalent 8th grade Algebra, or (3) altering their tracking systems to 
maintain differentiated instruction even as they broadened access to this once elite course (i.e., 
open new advanced courses beyond algebra for high-achieving students). Our analyses take an 
organizational view, investigating the accountability, institutional, technical/functional, and 
internal political pressures that schools faced in the Algebra-for-all era and the heterogeneous 
ways that schools changed their middle school mathematics course placement systems in 
response to these complex and often competing pressures. As such, we address an under-studied 
question in educational sociology: How and why do tracking systems vary across schools and 
over time (Kelly, 2007; Kelly & Price, 2011; Lucas & Berends, 2002)? In particular, we 
investigate time trends and school-level predictors of changes for two dimensions of school 
tracking systems: the proportion of students enrolled in advanced courses and the extent to which 





While some California schools detracked mathematics instruction by enrolling all 8th 
graders in algebra courses, others created new more-advanced academic pathways and, in the 
process, maintained differentiated mathematics instruction during this period. We describe this 
process, in which high-achieving students who might have once taken Algebra now complete 
Geometry, as “tracking up.” Particularly pronounced in relatively high-achieving and otherwise 
socially advantaged school settings, we argue that tracking up is a strategy through which 
socially-advantaged groups effectively maintain inequality.  
HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Curricular intensification in California  
Middle school mathematics is an early and important selection point in the United States’ 
educational system. While formal tracking is rare in U.S. elementary schools, many U.S. middle 
schools use a two-tiered tracking system in 8th grade mathematics. In this system, most students 
take a grade-level mathematics course that is often labelled “pre-Algebra” while a smaller 
proportion of high-achieving 8th graders enroll in Algebra. Since middle school math provides a 
gateway to high schools’ hierarchical structure of mathematics courses, students who take 
Algebra early are much more likely to gain access to Calculus and other advanced mathematics 
courses during their high school years. Accordingly, this initial sorting process has consequences 
for students’ later opportunities to learn, their postsecondary outcomes, and their transition to the 
labor market (Rose & Betts, 2004; Attewell & Domina, 2008; Long et al., 2012). State- and 
district-level policy-makers across the U.S. have thus attempted – with mixed consequences – to 
increase the proportion of students’ enrolled in 8th grade Algebra in order to intensify the rigor of 





Montgomery, & Lee, 2009; Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2015; Domina, McEachin, Penner, & 
Penner, 2015; Loveless, 2008; Penner, Domina, Penner, & Conley, 2015; Stein, Kaufman, 
Sherman, & Hillen, 2011).  
California is a national leader in this movement. Beginning in the late 1980s, the 
California Department of Education (CDE) repeatedly urged schools to place students into skills-
heterogeneous 8th grade algebra courses in order to detrack schools and equalize students’ 
opportunities to learn (CDE, 1985, 1991; Fenwick, 1987). The Algebra-for-all effort moved to 
the center of California’s educational policy portfolio over the next decade, even as its policy 
rationale before more diffuse. The 1998 Mathematics Framework for California Schools 
identified Algebra as the only appropriate mathematics course for California 8th graders, opening 
the door for the Algebra-for-all effort to become a part of the state’s school accountability 
policies. At the same time, the state stepped back from its earlier call for heterogeneous 
grouping, noting that “what students are taught has a greater effect on achievement than does 
how they are grouped” (CDE, 1998 pp. 13-14.) In doing so, state policy struck a balance that it 
maintained over the next 15 years – encouraging schools to enroll all 8th graders in Algebra 
while providing mixed messages about the appropriateness of skills-based grouping strategies to 
differentiate instruction among 8th grade Algebra classes.1  
 California’s first comprehensive school accountability legislation – authorized in 1999 
and fully implemented in 2004 – incorporated students’ middle school mathematics course 
enrollments in the Academic Performance Index (API), the summary scale used to measure 
																																								 																				
1 At the time, educational observers viewed the 1998 Framework as a turning point in the state’s “math wars,” in 
which a relatively conservative group of educational traditionalists wrested power over state mathematics policy 





school quality in California’s own accountability system. The California State Board of 
Education attempted to increase the accountability stakes associated with 8th grade Algebra in 
2008, when it declared Algebra the “sole course of record” for 8th graders2. This move put 
schools that tracked a large proportion of 8th graders into less advanced courses at risk for state 
takeover or reconstitution as a charter school by requiring 8th graders to demonstrate proficiency 
on the state’s end-of-course Algebra exam to satisfy federal and state accountability expectations 
(Rosin, Barondess, & Leichty, 2009). However, a series of California court rulings prevented the 
state’s 8th grade Algebra-for-all mandate from being fully implemented (California Schools 
Board Association vs. California State Board of Education, 2010). 
In the fall of 2010, California adopted the Common Core State Standards, which 
recommend a course of study for all 8th graders that combines pre-Algebraic and Algebraic 
concepts but are “designed to permit states to continue existing policies concerning Algebra in 
the 8th grade” (Common Core State Standards, 2010b). Some of the state’s vocal Algebra-for-all 
advocates decried the CCSS as a step back in academic rigor (Wurman & Evers, 2010) and the 
CDE discontinued the use of 8th grade algebra enrollments in the calculation of API scores 
beginning in the 2012-13 school year. However, the state’s 2013 Mathematics Framework 
includes a detailed appendix that attempts to guide schools toward mathematics course 











advanced mathematics courses (CDE, 2013). In 2015, the state authorized legislation requiring 
districts to use explicit and objective criteria for middle school mathematics course placement. 
Algebra-for-all and its consequences for organizational differentiation 
 California schools thus faced growing accountability pressures to increase 8th grade 
algebra enrollments between the late 1990s and 2010, when the state’s move to the Common 
Core began to redirect those pressures. Throughout this period, however, California middle 
schools received ambiguous signals about what Algebra-for-all meant for instructional 
differentiation. The Algebra-for-all effort took early inspiration from the school detracking 
effort. Teacher professional development and curricular resources developed by the state in 
cooperation with educational professional organizations encouraged instructors to equalize 
students’ opportunities to learn by enrolling all students in skills-heterogeneous 8th grade algebra 
courses (c.f. Laitsch, 2006; California Algebra Forum Statewide Network, 2009; Common Core 
State Standards 2010a). But by the time the state introduced accountability incentives associated 
with 8th grade Algebra in the early 2000s, the CDE had explicitly clarified that schools could 
maintain skills differentiated instruction even as they universalized 8th grade algebra enrollments.  
The ambiguous signals embedded in California’s Algebra-for-all effort left at least three 
responses open to the state’s middle schools: (1) Given the loose coupling of the state’s 
educational system, the policy’s weak incentives, and the lack of direct federal accountability 
pressure, schools could ignore the Algebra-for-all push and continue to enroll relatively few 
students in 8th grade Algebra; (2) Consistent with the Algebra-for-all movement’s early calls for 
heterogeneous instruction, they could detrack, replacing a middle school math course placement 





system that placed all students in 8th grade Algebra; or (3) Faced with pressures to maintain 
instructional differentiation, they could “track up,” enrolling more students in 8th grade Algebra 
while maintaining differentiation in middle school mathematics by creating a new doubly-
accelerated 8th grade geometry track. 
Using panel data from the universe of California public middle schools, our analyses 
investigate how schools negotiated among a complex set of pressures as they chose among these 
three options. In the section that follows, we divide the pressures schools faced in the Algebra-
for-all era into four broad categories – accountability, institutional, technical/functional, and 
internal political – and discuss their likely implications policies and practices related to middle 
school mathematics course assignments and instruction.  
Accountability pressures 
California’s 8th grade Algebra-for-all effort attempted to link the proportion of 8th graders 
who took end-of-course California Standards Tests (CST) in Algebra or more advanced 
mathematics to the state’s school accountability system. Such standards-based accountability 
policies have proliferated in the U.S. educational landscape, and several studies document the 
ways in which schools respond to accountability pressures. The existing evidence suggests that 
No Child Left Behind and other accountability policies have modest positive effects on observed 
achievement (Dee & Jacob, 2011), particularly in the schools most at risk for sanctions (Lauen & 
Gaddis, 2012). While the extent to which these gains reflect true improvements in students 
learning is unclear (Domina, et al., 2015; Booher-Jennings, 2005; Hallett, 2010; Neal & 
Schanzenbach, 2010; Reback, 2008), accountability policies clearly influence educational 





Hypothesis 1: Implementation of policies linking 8th grade algebra enrollments to 
accountability sanctions corresponded with broad-based increases in advanced 8th grade 
mathematics course enrollments, particularly in schools most at risk for accountability sanctions 
under the state’s accountability policy.  
Institutional pressures 
 It is unlikely, however, that schools respond to accountability pressures alone. 
Decentralization is a defining characteristic of educational governance in the United States, and 
state authorities have limited power to influence school-level policies and practices (Bidwell, 
2001; Henig, 2013; Meyer, Scott, & Deal 1979; Rowan, 1982). This may be particularly true in 
the current case, in which California’s schools nearly doubled 8th grade algebra enrollment rates 
in the wake of a policy that was never fully implemented and thus lacked strong mandates or 
sanctions (Rosin et al., 2009; Domina et al., 2015). Meyer and Rowan (1975, 2006) argue that 
since the goals of schooling are diffuse, schools are structured less to maximize technical 
efficiency than to maintain social legitimacy. As a result, neo-institutionalism suggests that 
schools are sensitive to normative pressures and institutional isomorphism.  
Beginning in 2004, schools faced incentives from the state’s accountability system to 
increase 8th grade algebra enrollments. But the tide turned in 2010 when the courts blocked the 
state’s move to make 8th grade Algebra the course of record. In the same year, the state took a 
second step away from the Algebra-for-all when it moved to adopt the CCSS. From a pure 
accountability perspective, one might expect 8th grade algebra enrollments to begin to decline 
during the post-2010 period. By contrast, neo-institutional theory suggests that Algebra-for-all 





resources developing curricula and instructional strategies consistent with the Algebra-for-all 
effort, teachers may have come to see broad access to accelerated Algebra as an instructional 
imperative. In such a case: 
Hypothesis 2: Institutional pressures cause schools to maintain high levels of algebra 
enrollments even after the elimination of accountability pressures (see, c.f. Tolbert & Zucker, 
1983).  
Technical/functional pressures 
The assumption that increasing the proportion of 8th graders enrolled in Algebra would 
accompany broader changes to the organization of mathematics instruction in California middle 
schools was central to the origin of California’s 8th grade Algebra-for-all effort. Specifically, 
many Algebra-for-all advocates sought to replace a two-tiered system of 8th grade mathematics 
instruction – in which many students enrolled in grade-level general mathematics courses in 8th 
grade and a small number of students took accelerated Algebra – with a detracked Algebra-for-
all system.  
 There is good reason to hope that making such a change would improve schools’ 
educational effectiveness. As noted above, several studies indicate that students who are exposed 
to rigorous curriculum and instruction experience greater achievement gains on average than 
those who are not. However, these gains are by no means assured. Tracking systems make it 
possible for teachers to target their instruction to a relatively homogeneous set of students’ skills 
and needs (Hallinan, 1994). As such, teachers in settings with a large variance in students’ skills 
may prefer selective track systems (Rosenbaum, 1976, 1999; Kelly & Price, 2011). Further, 





particular to challenges associated with teaching Algebra to students who lack foundational 
mathematics skills and preparing teachers to teach new materials to more heterogeneous student 
populations (Clotfelter et al., 2015; Domina et al., 2015).  
 These technical concerns may discourage schools from responding to the state’s Algebra-
for-all push. In particular, technical pressures suggest that:  
Hypothesis 3: 8th grade algebra enrollment rates increase slowly in relatively low-
achieving schools as well as schools that enroll highly heterogeneous student populations. 
Additionally, these technical concerns encourage schools that educate students with a broad 
range of prior skills to continue to offer a range of skills-differentiated mathematics course 
offerings even as they increase 8th grade algebra enrollments.  
Internal political pressures 
Furthermore, many constituents in California schools likely had a vested interest in 
maintaining differentiation in middle school mathematics. Case-study research suggests that elite 
students and their parents resist detracking efforts, particularly in schools that enroll large 
proportions of academically advantaged students (Oakes & Lipton, 1992; Wells & Oakes, 1996; 
Wells & Serna, 1996; Welner & Burris, 2006). Resistance to detracking in California middle  
schools could have taken the form of direct defiance of the Algebra-for-all initiative and a simple 
refusal to increase algebra enrollments. Alternatively, schools could have resisted detracking by 
creating an even more advanced mathematics option to accompany increased access to Algebra. 
The latter possibility is consistent with the theory of Effectively Maintained Inequality 
(EMI). EMI hypothesizes that in settings in which access to previously scarce educational 





new meaningful distinctions (Lucas, 2001). For example, although the universalization of 
secondary degree completion inevitably corresponds with narrowing class-based inequalities in 
high school graduation (Raftery & Hout, 1993), college preparatory diplomas and other 
distinctions among high school graduates serve to maintain affluent students’ educational 
advantages (Lucas, 2001). In our setting, a parallel process might involve the creation of a 
doubly-advanced new 8th grade geometry track in schools in which access to Algebra broadened 
considerably. At the school-level, EMI implies that efforts to create new forms of curricular 
differentiation will be most pronounced in settings serving large populations of students from 
privileged social backgrounds (e.g. Klugman, 2013). We therefore predict:  
Hypothesis 4: Relatively affluent California schools were most likely to track up during 
the Algebra-for-all era, increasing the degree of differentiation in middle school mathematics by 
enrolling a growing proportion of students in a new, more advanced 8th grade geometry track.  
DATA AND METHODS 
School-level Panel Data, 2003-2013 
 This paper tracks school responses to California’s 8th grade Algebra-for-all effort, using 
annual school-level panel data collected by the California Department of Education reported in 
the California Basic Educational Data System. These publicly available data include detailed 
information on school enrollments, demographics, course offerings, staffing, as well as student 
achievement for each school year beginning in 2002-03.3 We focus on the balanced panel of 
1,524 California schools that provide data on course enrollments between 2002-03 and 2012-13, 
																																								 																				





which covers 85 percent of California 8th graders over the study period.4 Descriptive analyses are 
weighted by 8th grade enrollments, so that the analyses reflect the average experiences of all 8th 
graders enrolled at sample schools during the study period. Multivariate models control for 
schools’ 8th grade enrollment. 
8th grade Algebra and Organizational Differentiation 
Our analyses begin with a consideration of how 8th grade algebra enrollment rates 
changed in California middle schools during the Algebra-for-all period. We measure 8th grade 
algebra enrollment rates in California using data from the end-of-course California Standards 
Tests (CSTs). Like students in middle schools throughout the United States, 8th graders in most 
California middle schools enroll in one of several tiered mathematics courses, including general 
mathematics or pre-Algebra, Algebra, and Geometry. Since California students take the CST 
linked to their 8th grade mathematics course, one can use students’ math CST as a highly reliable 
proxy for 8th grade math course enrollment.5  
																																								 																				
4 Since we are interested in course placement trends across the time period, we exclude approximately 1,000 
California schools that opened or closed during the study period or failed to report data in more than one study year. 
Excluded schools tend to be smaller (with mean enrollment half the size of included schools) with higher 
proportions of poor, black, and Hispanic students than the analytic sample. However, analyses conducted on partial 
panel data return substantively similar results.  
5 End-of-course tests provide important advantages over course title as a measure of course completion. Since 
California school accountability policy requires all districts report data on end-of-course test-taking for all students 
using a common form, comparable data are available on this measure across schools and over time. While student-
level course enrollment data are not publicly available for California public school students, our analyses of data 
from one large California public school district indicates that end-of-course tests provide a relatively reliable proxy 
for course content. In this district, approximately 99% of 8th graders who enroll in pre-Algebra courses take the 8th 
grade General Mathematics CST. Similarly, 99% of students in Algebra I courses enroll in the 8th grade Algebra 
CST. In addition, several schools in this district offer a two-year Algebra course sequence. Approximately 95% of 
the 8th graders who take the first year of this two-year Algebra course sequence take the 8th grade General 
Mathematics CST. Analyses of data from another large California public school district point to a similarly high 





We consider increases in the proportion of 8th graders enrolled in Algebra or a more 
advanced mathematics course as one indication of school-level compliance with the state’s 
Algebra-for-all effort. To further investigate the policy’s implementation, we construct an 
additional measure identifying schools that “detracked” under the Algebra-for-all policy by 
enrolling 90% or more of their 8th graders in Algebra. Importantly, this measure does not 
consider schools that enrolled a large proportion of students in 8th grade Geometry or a more 
advanced course as “detracked,” since these more advanced courses differentiate instruction. 
Although we lack data to directly assess either the content of instruction in algebra courses or the 
extent to which schools sort students into separate Algebra classes based on their prior 
achievement, our analyses assume that enrolling virtually all students in the same level of 
coursework minimizes differentiation in 8th grade mathematics.  
In subsequent analyses we focus on the proportion of students in California schools who 
take doubly-advanced 8th grade Geometry courses. These analyses provide preliminary insights 
into the extent to which increases in 8th grade algebra enrollments correspond with broader 
changes in organizational differentiation in California middle schools. To the extent to which 
California schools made 8th grade Algebra a universal offering, we would expect 8th grade 
geometry enrollment rates to remain flat during the study period. Alternatively, we view 
increases in 8th grade geometry enrollments as indicators of a process through which schools 
maintain differentiated curricula even as they broaden access to 8th grade Algebra. We further 





schools offer Geometry or other advanced courses for 8th graders. 6 At the beginning of the study 
period, few California middle schools offered Geometry to 8th graders, and approximately 2 
percent of the state’s 8th graders completed this doubly-advanced mathematics course.  
To investigate the ways in which organizational differentiation changed in California 
middle schools during the Algebra-for-all era, we construct a time-varying measure of the 
number of different mathematics courses schools offer to 8th graders. This measure is based on 
an annual CDE survey in which school leaders report on the number of students enrolled in a 
range of mathematics courses, with titles ranging from Developmental Mathematics to Algebra 
II. We count any course that enrolls at least one 8th grader as an available course, and sum the 
number of different courses each school offers to 8th graders annually. We view this as a direct 
measure of the range of curricula schools offer to 8th graders. As a supplement to this analysis, 
we consider whether a school offered a remedial or basic-level mathematics course in each of the 
study years.  
Analyses 
 Our analyses address changes in the organizational structure of middle school 
mathematics instruction in California schools during the 2003-2013 period and the 
characteristics of schools that were associated with these changes. In addition to investigating 
unconditional trends in each of the school-level measures of instructional differentiation, we use 
panel data on California schools to estimate a series of models that examine change as a function 
																																								 																				
6 Our school-level measures of course offerings, including the measure of whether or not schools offer Geometry or 
other advanced courses for 8th graders, the number of different 8th grade math courses schools offer, and whether or 





of time-varying school characteristics. Each of these models is a three-level mixed model,7 
including random intercepts to account for clustering within schools over time and among 
schools within districts. The models proceed in three steps. The first two models take following 
general form:  
(1) 𝑌!"# =  𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑋!"# + 𝛾! + 𝜌! + 𝜎! + 𝑒!"# 
where 𝑌!"# measures 8th grade math instructional organization for school s in district d at 
year t; 𝑋!"# is a set of time-varying school-level covariates describing observable characteristics 
of s at time t (described in detail below); 𝛾! is a set of indicator variables (or time fixed-effects) 
comparing each study year with 2008, the year in which the state moved to make Algebra the test 
for record in 8th grade mathematics; 𝜌!is a school-level random effect; 𝜎! is a district-level 
random effect; and 𝑒!"# is the time-varying idiosyncratic school-level error term. This model 
draws upon the rich school-level data available from the CDE to control for time-varying 
observable school characteristics in 𝑋!"#. Controls include: the natural log of total 8th grade 
enrollment and a socio-economic disadvantage scale constructed by averaging two variables: a 
standardized measure of the proportion of schools’ 8th graders who are African-American or 
Hispanic and a standardized measure of the proportion of a schools’ 8th graders who qualify for 
free or reduced lunch.8 In addition, we control for the mean level of Algebra readiness among 8th 
																																								 																				
7 Each of the multilevel models reported here, including models predicting dichotomous outcomes, are estimated 
using Stata’s xtmixed comment, with random effects specified at the district and school level. Three-level logistic or 
probit regression models for the dichotomous school detracking and basic/remedial course offering outcomes do not 
converge. However, supplementary logistic two-level random effects models (with random effect at either the 
school or district level, but not both) return qualitatively similar results for these dichotomous outcomes.  





graders enrolled in school s in year t as well as the within-school variance in Algebra readiness, 
using lagged data on student achievement in prior mathematics CSTs.9,10  
Our second model adds a measure of school exposure to pressure on California’s school 
accountability law (Public School Accountability Act). Each year the state provides schools with 
an Academic Progress Index (API) score. This score, which ranges from 200 to 1000, is 
essentially a school-level weighted average of students’ performance on math, reading, science, 
and history end of year and course assessments. The state’s formula lowers students’ scores by 
one proficiency level if they are not enrolled in at least Algebra in 8th grade. Although there are 
no immediate sanctions or rewards under PSAA, schools’ API scores are publicly available and 
local media often rank schools by API score and API score change. As such, we include a school 
mean-centered version of schools’ prior API scores in our model. Much like a school fixed 
effect, the demeaned value removes schools time-invariant influence and uses within school 
																																								 																				
9 We use lagged 7th grade mathematics CST scores and twice-lagged 6th grade mathematics CST scores to measure 
mean Algebra readiness in California middle schools. Each of these measures has advantages and disadvantages for 
our purposes. 7th grade CST scores are useful since they are most proximal to 8th grade mathematics course 
placement. However, a small proportion of California 7th graders take Algebra in order to be on track for 8th grade 
Geometry. These 7th grade Algebra scores are not directly comparable with 7th grade General Math scores. 
Furthermore, 7th grade Algebra test-taking is endogenous to the process under consideration in this paper. Therefore, 
we prefer 6th grade math CST scores as a measure of Algebra readiness. However, these scores are unavailable for 
approximately 1/3 of the schools in our sample since these schools do not enroll 6th grades. Therefore, we impute 6th 
grade mathematics CST scores for schools that are missing this measure, based on their mean 7th grade CST General 
Math scores, mean 7th grade Algebra CST scores, proportion of 7th graders who take the Algebra CST, and school 
demographics using Stata’s “mi impute” sequential imputation for monotone missing data imputation package. For 
schools that have both 6th and 7th grade math CSTs, this equation explains more than 75% of the variation in 6th 
grade CST means. 
10 We use lagged 7th grade General Math CST scores as well as the proportion of 7th graders who take the Algebra 
CST in 7th grade to measure the variance in students’ Algebra readiness within schools. In addition to providing 
school-level mean scores for 7th graders who take the General Math CSTs (approximately 97 percent of the 7th 
graders enrolled in sample schools over the course of the study), CDE provides data on the percent of students who 
scored at in each of 5 proficiency levels on this test: Far Below Basic, Below Basic, Basic, Proficient, and 
Advanced. We use these data to calculate: 
 Var(7th grade Gen Math) =  !
!
(𝑥! −!!!! 𝜇)! 
Where n=5 for the five proficiency bands;  𝑥!is the mid-point on each of the five proficiency levels and 𝜇 is the 





variation to estimate the relationship between our outcomes and schools’ API standing. In other 
specifications available upon request, we include both the demeaned API score and schools’ 
average API score or schools twice lagged API score and the difference between their once and 
twice lagged API scores.11 
 The third model takes a growth approach, adding controls for lagged values of the 
dependent variable as time-varying measures of a school’s 8th grade mathematics course 
structure: 
(2) 𝑌!"# =  𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑋!"# + 𝛽!𝑌!"#!! + 𝛾! + 𝜌! + 𝜎! + 𝑒!"# 
where 𝑌!"#!!includes the once-lagged, standardized value of a school’s  8th grade Algebra or 
higher enrollment rates, the quadratic of that measure, and lagged versions of the dependent 
variable as appropriate.12 
Arguing that schools respond to accountability pressures, Hypothesis 1 states that the 
proportion of California 8th graders enrolled in 8th grade Algebra or higher should increase over 
time, yielding positive coefficients on 8th grade Algebra or higher enrollment rates for each year 
after 2008, regardless of modeling strategy. Further, this hypothesis suggests that schools that 
																																								 																				
11 The school accountability literature often looks at the within school change in accountability standing to estimate 
the relationship between school accountability pressure and student achievement  (Rouse, Hannaway, Goldhaber, & 
Figlio, 2013). We hypothesize that schools respond primarily to changes in their own API standing relative to the 
time-invariant effect on algebra enrollment--rather than absolute values. We construct our measure of accountability 
pressure by subtracting each school’s mean API value across all study years from their time-varying lagged API 
value to capture these policy-relevant school-level deviations in API scores. Because API estimates are based only 
on within-school variation, this measure is analogous to those based on a school fixed effects specification 
(Raudenbush 2009). For example, we hypothesize that a school which experiences a dip in their API score in the 
prior year relative to their average performance will be more likely to increase algebra enrollment in the current year 
to help boost their current API score. By contrast, schools that experience a relatively high prior API score may feel 
less pressure to use 8th grade algebra enrollment as a means to boost API scores. Further, including school mean-
centered API scores rather than absolute API scores mitigates concerns around the high correlation between school 
mean CST scores and API scores (r=.81 across the sample), which is due to the fact that CST scores contribute to 
API score calculation. 





experience a decrease in mean-centered API scores in the prior year will be more likely to further 
increase their algebra enrollments to avoid the API penalties for 8th grade students not enrolled in 
at least Algebra.  
Even after the state began to relax accountability pressures in 2012, a neo-institutionalist 
approach posits that institutional pressures led schools to continue to increase 8th grade Algebra 
or higher enrollment rates. Accordingly, Hypothesis 2 predicts that the coefficient for 2010-2013 
in these models should remain positive.  
Hypothesis 3 is based on the expectation that technical issues surrounding advanced 
course instruction impede the implementation of universal Algebra and encourage instructional 
differentiation, particularly in schools with low average achievement levels and high degrees of 
between-student variation in Algebra-readiness. It predicts a negative relationship between 
school-level 7th grade mean CST scores and geometry enrollments and the number of 
mathematics course offerings within schools, conditional on controls. Conversely, Hypothesis 3 
predicts a positive relationship between variance in 7th grade CST scores and these measures of 
instructional differentiation.  
Finally, Hypothesis 4 predicts that pressures to maintain the curricular advantages 
enjoyed by relatively affluent students will lead socio-economically advantaged schools to “track 
up.” As such, this hypothesis suggests that 8th grade geometry course enrollments will increase 
particularly rapidly in economically advantaged schools, all else equal.  
Findings 
Table 1 provides a descriptive profile of the 8th graders enrolled in 1,524 California 





The table clearly indicates that 8th grade algebra enrollments increased in California schools 
during the period in which the state pursued its Algebra-for-all effort. The proportion of 8th 
graders enrolled in Algebra or a more advanced course nearly doubled between 2003 and 2013, 
increasing from 35 percent to 65 percent. Eighth grade advanced course enrollment rates grew 
particularly rapidly between 2003 and 2005, increasing by nearly 40 percent. A second period of 
relatively rapid growth occurred during the period in which the state moved to make Algebra the 
course of record. Advanced course enrollment rates grew by 13 percent between 2007 and 2009. 
The growth in 8th grade algebra enrollments continued despite court rulings blocking the 
implementation of the state’s effort to make Algebra the “course of record” for 8th graders, 
growing by an additional 11 percent between 2009 and 2011. Although this growth rate slowed 
in the 2011-13 period as the state moved toward to the Common Core and eliminated 
accountability incentives associated with enrolling students in 8th grade Algebra or more 
advanced courses, it did not reverse.  
TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
It is not clear, however, that the trend toward curricular intensification reduced the degree 
of differentiation in middle school mathematics in California. The percent of students enrolled in 
8th grade Geometry grew at a considerably faster rate than the percent of students enrolled in 8th 
grade Algebra. In 2003, less than 5 percent of California middle schools offered Geometry to 8th 
graders and just 2 percent of the state’s 8th graders enrolled in the course. By 2013, 
approximately half of the state’s middle schools offered the course and the rate of enrollment had 





While smaller in absolute terms than the increase in algebra enrollments statewide, this 
rapid and accelerating geometry growth reflects meaningful changes in the structure of 
mathematics opportunities. To gauge the magnitude of these changes, consider a hypothetical 
“average” school enrolling the panel mean of 427 8th graders. The increase throughout the period 
corresponds to increasing from 10 students in Geometry (=427.2 * .0225) to 25 (=358.0 * .0703), 
enough for a full class of Geometry. The comparable increase for Algebra would have been from 
149 students (=427.2 * 0.349) to 234 (=358.0 * 0.653). In most cases, this increase of 85 students 
in Algebra would occasion the creation of three to four new Algebra classes. Said differently, for 
every 5 extra students placed in Algebra between 2003 and 2013, 1 was placed in Geometry. 
Since these average increases include the third of schools that never offered Geometry, they 
understate the magnitude of changes at schools that pursued the tracking up strategy. 
Consistent with the increase in the number of schools offering 8th grade Geometry, Table 
1 further indicates that the mean number of 8th grade math courses offered by California schools 
increased over the study period. The average school offered approximately 2.5 distinct 8th grade 
math courses in each of the years 2003-2009. However, course offerings began to increase after 
2010 (a year in which these data are not available). By 2013, the population-weighted mean 
number of math courses offered in California public schools reached 3.4, an increase of nearly 
one-third over the 2003 average.  Course titles do not tell us how schools employ different 
mathematics courses, and in particular we lack data on the degree to which schools added 
“double-dose” mathematics courses to simultaneously enroll at-risk students in Algebra and a 
supplementary mathematics course (see Cortes, Goodman, & Nomi, 2015; Nomi & Allensworth, 





U.S. middle and high schools, then increasing numbers of distinct courses may also reflect 
greater skills-based differentiation. Consistent with this reading, supplementary analyses indicate 
that in addition to the sharp increase in the number of schools offering 8th grade Geometry 
courses, the number of schools offering basic or remedial courses to 8th graders also rose 
modestly. 
Table 1 also provides data on the student composition of our sample of California public 
schools. The proportion of Hispanic students in our sample schools grew by approximately 20 
percent and the proportion of Asian students grew by 5 percent; while the proportion of white, 
African American and other-race students declined. The proportion of students who qualify for 
free or reduced priced lunch increased by more than a third during the study period that spans the 
Great Recession (2007-2010, approximately). Enrollments in our panel of schools declined 
slightly during the study period, presumably due to the construction of new schools to relieve 
overcrowding in growing communities.  
As the three scatterplots in Figure 1 indicate, rates of enrollment in 8th grade Algebra or a 
more advanced course grew particularly rapidly in California middle schools that enroll 
relatively high proportions of poor, black, and/or Hispanic students. The y-axis on these scatter 
plots is the percent of students in each middle school who enrolled in Algebra or a more 
advanced course in their 8th grade year. The x-axis is the school socio-economic disadvantage 
scale. To improve legibility, these plots are based on a random sample of half of the schools in 
the full analysis panel. We display most California schools as grey dots; but in light of our focus 





graders in the same mathematics course as plus signs. In both cases, the scatterplot is weighted, 
such that schools with larger 8th grade enrollments are displayed proportionately larger. 
FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE 
In 2003, relatively advantaged schools enrolled more students in 8th grade Algebra or 
Geometry than disadvantaged schools. While a small number of schools enrolled nearly all 
students in these advanced courses in 2003 – including a handful of highly disadvantaged 
schools – in general this plot shows a negative association between school disadvantage and the 
proportion of students enrolled in 8th grade Algebra or a more advanced course (r=-0.22). Over 
the course of the Algebra-for-all period, this relationship changed as many disadvantaged 
schools dramatically increased students’ access to advanced courses. By 2008, there were few 
schools that enrolled fewer than 25 percent of students in 8th grade Algebra or Geometry. 
Meanwhile a large number of schools, represented as plus signs in the plots, detracked by 
enrolling nearly all students in 8th grade Algebra. Notably, this group includes a large mass of 
highly socio-economically disadvantaged schools. Accordingly, in 2008 and 2013 the association 
between school disadvantage and enrollment in 8th grade Algebra or Geometry is weaker than in 
2003 (r=-0.09).  
The proportion of students enrolled in 8th grade Algebra or Geometry continued to rise 
between 2008 and 2013. As a result, California middle schools are increasingly clustered at the 
top third of the 2013 scatterplot. However, we note a new divergence among schools that 
enrolled all or nearly all students in advanced mathematics courses in 2013. While a larger 
number of relatively advantaged schools enrolled nearly all students in 8th grade Algebra or 





and Geometry rather than detracking (represented by circles). By contrast, the majority of the 
schools who detracked by enrolling nearly all students in 8th grade Algebra in 2013 (represented 
by plus signs) served relatively large proportions of poor, black, or Hispanic students.  
Trends in advanced course enrollment rates 
The multivariate analyses that follow provide a closer look at these school-level 
enrollment trends and the related changes in schools’ instructional offerings. Our first analyses 
focus on the measure that is most proximal to California’s Algebra-for-all effort, the proportion 
of students who enroll in at least Algebra during the 8th grade. If schools respond to 
accountability pressures, the implementation of policies linking 8th grade algebra enrollments to 
accountability sanctions will correspond with broad-based increases in inclusiveness in 8th grade 
math courses, particularly in schools that are most at risk for accountability sanctions.  While 
policy pressures associated with Algebra-for-all began to relax in 2009, norms about Algebra 
learning and instruction may have also changed in California middle schools. If so, isomorphic 
pressures may have caused California schools to continue to expand 8th grade algebra 
enrollments after the state began to deemphasize Algebra-for-all in 2010. 
Table 2 reports a series of multilevel regression models that consider trends in the 
proportion of 8th graders enrolling in Algebra or Geometry and how these trends vary with 
school characteristics. The first model in Table 2 indicates that the increase in advanced 
mathematics course placements that we observe in the descriptive data reported in Table 1 is 
largely independent of changes in degree of socio-economic disadvantage, school size and 7th 
grade test scores that occurred during the same period. The reference category for the year fixed 





preceded the CDE’s move to make Algebra the course of record for 8th grade mathematics. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the model indicates that 8th grade Algebra rates increased each 
year leading up to this decision, net of school demographics and achievement. However, 
consistent with Hypothesis 2, we find that algebra enrollments remained high after 2010. 
TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
The fact that statewide curricular expansion is independent of demographic and other 
changes in California does not suggest, however, that advanced 8th grade math course 
enrollments are independent of school demographics and other factors. Model 1 of Table 2 
suggests that large schools enroll a smaller proportion of students in 8th grade Algebra or 
Geometry than smaller schools, net of controls. Further, consistent with Hypothesis 3, this model 
suggests that technical/functional pressures influenced the extent to which schools increased 
algebra enrollments. Model 1 points to a strong positive association between student Algebra 
readiness – as measured by school-level means in 7th grade mathematics test scores – and 8th 
grade algebra or geometry enrollments. A standard deviation increase in 7th grade mathematics 
test scores is conditionally associated with a 5 percentage point increase in 8th grade algebra and 
geometry course enrollment. Interestingly, however, the dispersion in students’ 7th grade math 
test scores is negatively associated with the proportion of 8th graders who enroll in one of these 
advanced courses.13 Our results thus suggest that relatively low-achieving and skills-
																																								 																				
13	Unconditional correlations (available by request) point to a negative association between school disadvantage and 
advanced course enrollment. However, disadvantage and student prior achievement are closely correlated. Model 1 






heterogeneous schools are slow to increase curricular rigor, perhaps because these diverse 
schools use low-level courses to differentiate instruction.  
This table’s second model adds a control for schools’ mean-centered API scores. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, this measure of school perceived accountability pressures is 
statistically significant and negative. The magnitude of this independent relationship is small, 
suggesting that a typical school might be expected to increase 8th grade algebra enrollments by 
approximately half a percentage point in response to a standard-deviation sized decline in its API 
score, net of other control variables. Nonetheless, this relationship suggests that state 
accountability pressures worked as designed, increasing 8th grade algebra enrollments on the 
margin.  
The analyses reported in the second model in Table 2 indicate that these associations are 
largely robust to controls for path dependence in school advanced course enrollments. Schools 
that enroll large proportions of students in 8th grade Algebra or Geometry in a given year tend to 
continue to do so in the next year. Controlling for enrollment lags shifts the model’s analytic 
focus from 8th grade algebra or geometry enrollment rates to the year-to-year growth in these 
rates. The year coefficients in this model compare schools’ rate of 8th grade Algebra or geometry 
enrollment growth with their rate in the reference 2007-08 school year. In the 2008-09 year, 
school algebra or geometry enrollment rates grew approximately two percentage points faster 
than in the year before. This model reveals that advanced course enrollments grew particularly 
rapidly in 2008-09 and 2009-10 when the CDE made Algebra the course of record for 8th grade 
mathematics. But, consistent with Hypothesis 2, the conditional advanced mathematics course 





controls, 8th grade algebra or geometry enrollment growth in California middle schools peaked in 
2011-12. While growth stopped in 2012-13, when the state eliminated API incentives associated 
with 8th grade Algebra, it did not reverse. Furthermore, this model indicates that net of API 
scores and prior achievement, schools with socio-economically disadvantaged student 
populations enroll significantly more students in 8th grade Algebra than relatively advantaged 
schools. 
The analyses reported in the second panel of Table 2 consider the odds that schools 
enrolled more than 90% of 8th graders in Algebra itself (excluding Geometry and other more 
advanced courses). Early Algebra-for-all advocates hoped this policy movement would lead to 
large-scale detracking in California middle schools, and Algebra-for-all detracking peaked in 
2009 when the state signaled its intent to make Algebra the course of record for 8th graders. In 
that year, approximately 20 percent of California schools enrolled virtually all 8th graders in 
Algebra. That rate declined significantly both in absolute terms and conditional on school 
characteristics in the subsequent years. Schools with relatively high levels of disadvantage were 
more likely to pursue an Algebra-for-all course placement pattern.  Further, the likelihood that 
schools pursued this path varies negatively with school mean-centered API scores, suggesting 
that accountability pressures may have influenced school decisions to detrack math sequences by 
enrolling all 8th graders in Algebra. Schools facing accountability pressures may have interpreted 
the state’s Algebra-for-all push as an absolute mandate; alternatively, they may have responded 
to normative calls for detracking during the Algebra-for-all period.  





The analyses reported in Figures 1 and 2 as well as the multivariate analyses in Table 3 
consider 8th grade geometry enrollments as an alternative approach to increasing 8th grade 
algebra enrollments. These analysis suggests that rather than detracking by enrolling all students 
in 8th grade Algebra, many schools tracked up, enrolling many students in 8th grade Algebra but 
sorting a smaller number of students into highly selective 8th grade geometry courses.  
Figure 2 provides a graphic representation of 8th grade mathematics course enrollment 
trends in California schools during the study period. By overlaying a series of population-
weighted violin plots for 8th grade Algebra and geometry enrollments, this figure represents the 
changing distribution of school placement patterns. In the middle of this time series – 
particularly 2005-2009 – the distribution of 8th grade Algebra became somewhat bimodal as a 
group of schools implemented universal or nearly-universal 8th grade Algebra placements. 
Although the rate at which 8th graders enrolled in Algebra or a higher course continued to grow 
between 2010 and 2013, fewer schools enrolled all or nearly all students in 8th grade Algebra 
during this period. Rather, many schools seem to have created a newer more academically-
rigorous 8th grade mathematics tracking system, in which 8th grade Algebra is the modal course 
but a small group of advanced students enroll in 8th grade Geometry. As this figure makes clear, 
geometry enrollments remain small in absolute terms relative to algebra enrollments. However, 
these courses became increasingly important to the state’s middle school mathematics curricula 
during the study period.  
FIGURE 2 & 3 AROUND HERE 
Figure 3 provides a graphical illustration of this tracking up phenomenon, reporting 





axis) and total 8th grade Algebra and geometry enrollments (on the x-axis) for all schools in the 
analysis sample in 2003, 2008, and 2013. Figure 3 truncates the scale for 8th grade Geometry to 
draw attention to the ways in which the relation between geometry enrollments and any 
advanced course enrollments vary over time. In the 2003 and 2008 cohorts, the relationship 
between 8th grade algebra and geometry placement rates is curvilinear, with geometry enrollment 
rates approaching zero in schools where no students enroll in Algebra and declining in schools 
where nearly all students enroll in advanced courses. In the 2003 cohort the 8th grade geometry 
rate is highest in schools that enroll approximately 60 percent of 8th graders in advanced courses; 
in 2008 peak geometry enrollments occur in schools that enroll nearly 80 percent of 8th graders 
in Algebra. In 2013, this peak is much less pronounced, suggesting that rather than 
universalizing 8th grade Algebra, many schools tracked up by enrolling students in 8th grade 
Geometry. 
While 8th grade geometry enrollment rates are far lower in absolute terms than 8th grade 
algebra enrollments, the multivariate analyses reported in Table 3 indicate that 8th grade 
geometry rates grew rapidly throughout the study period. This growth occurred across the time 
series, continuing even after the state abandoned an explicit push for Algebra-for-all and adopted 
the Common Core. We find that 8th grade geometry enrollments are highly path dependent. 
Further, consistent with the technical/functional pressures articulated in Hypothesis 3, they vary 
positively with students’ prior skill levels, as is the case for advanced course enrollments more 
generally. However, the demographic profile of schools that increased 8th grade geometry 
enrollments is different in important ways from the demographic and skills profile associated 





enroll more students in 8th grade Geometry, while schools with more socioeconomically 
advantaged populations tend to enroll more students in this highly advanced course (net of prior 
achievement). The latter finding is consistent with EMI and Hypothesis 4. Further, mean levels 
of prior skills are positively associated with 8th grade geometry enrollment rates net of controls, 
while within-school skills variance is negatively associated with 8th grade Geometry. The models 
reported in the second panel of Table 3, which considers the odds that schools offered 8th grade 
geometry course, return very similar results to models considering 8th grade geometry enrollment 
rates.    
TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 
 Taken together, these findings suggest that many relatively affluent and high-achieving 
California schools increased 8th grade geometry enrollments and broadened the array of 8th grade 
math courses they offered during the Algebra-for-all period. These trends–consistent with the 
idea that schools tracked up as they expanded access to high-status 8th grade Algebra classes – 
seem to have persisted after the state abandoned its plan to tightly link the Algebra-for-all effort 
with the school accountability systems. These results may foreshadow trends in school tracking 
systems in the CCSS era and beyond.  
The multivariate analyses reported in the first panel of Table 4 provide further evidence 
to suggest that on the whole California schools increased the degree of curricular differentiation 
in middle school mathematics during the study period. These analyses use a count of the number 
of different 8th grade mathematics courses offered in a school as a proxy for differentiation in 
California middle school 8th grade mathematics offerings. Their findings suggest that the number 





Algebra-for-all period even after controlling for demographic and other changes. Net of controls, 
we find that large schools tend to offer more 8th grade mathematics classes but schools that 
educate large proportions of Black, Hispanic, and poor students tend to offer fewer courses. The 
association between mean test scores and course offerings is nonlinear, with very high- and very 
low-achieving schools as well as schools with high levels of variance in prior-year CSTs offering 
a broader array of math courses. Adding a control for lagged API scores in Model 2 does not 
substantially change the relationships observed in Model 1. The second set of analyses in Table 4 
indicates that many California middle schools also added remedial or basic 8th grade math 
courses during the study period. Notably, however, this increase in remedial courses occurred 
exclusively during the study period’s final years, as the state began to move away from the 
Algebra-for-all effort. It is further notable that remedial course offerings are positively associated 
with school disadvantage and negatively associated with 8th grade algebra enrollment rates 
across the period. Discussions with school leaders suggest that in some cases these remedial 
courses are “double-dose” courses targeted at low-skill students in 8th grade algebra courses. 
While a systematic investigation of the spread of these courses is beyond this paper’s scope, this 
analysis points to one way that curricular differentiation may increase in California middle 
schools that did not pursue a “tracking up” strategy.  
TABLE 4 AROUND HERE 
Tracking up and the distribution of educational opportunity 
 California middle schools faced a complex and conflicting set of accountability, 
institutional, technical/functional, and internal political pressures as they formulated their 





disposal. California schools might have ignored the state’s Algebra-for-all effort. Alternatively, 
they could have moved students from pre-Algebra or other lower-level 8th grade mathematics 
courses to 8th grade Algebra, increasing the degree of skills heterogeneity as well as racial and 
socio-economic diversity in high-level 8th grade algebra courses and providing students who 
might have once been relegated to low-track courses new opportunities to learn. Finally, schools 
might have created new higher-level tracks, effectively reproducing existing structures of 
organization differentiation in the Algebra-for-all era. Such a strategy, which we label as 
tracking up, would more likely maintain previously existing patterns of inequality in access to 
the highest level courses, even as it allowed schools to dramatically expand 8th grade algebra 
enrollments.  
Our analyses indicate that in the aggregate, California schools took the third option, using 
8th grade geometry and other advanced courses to maintain organizational differentiation in 
middle school mathematics. Eighth grade geometry enrollments tripled in California during the 
period in which 8th grade algebra enrollments doubled. While the phrase “Algebra-for-all” 
suggests a movement to decrease the degree of differentiation in mathematics, we find that the 
typical California middle school increased the number of middle school mathematics courses 
they offered during the Algebra-for-all period. Relatively socio-economically advantaged, high-
achieving, and academically heterogeneous schools were particularly likely to pursue this 
tracking up strategy.  
Tracking up is not simply a matter of reproducing prior track structures at a more 
advanced level. The number of California 8th graders enrolled in Algebra grew more in absolute 





top of California’s emerging middle school math track structure is small and highly selective, 
enrolling just 7 percent of students across the state in 2013. By contrast, approximately 35 
percent of California 8th graders enrolled in Algebra in 2003, when that course tended to be the 
most advanced math course available. However, although the new high math track in California 
middle schools is smaller, California middle schools seem to have created a more highly 
differentiated organizational structure for 8th grade mathematics during the study period. 
California middle schools offer more different mathematics courses in 2013 than in 2003, 
enrolling 8th graders in courses that range from remedial mathematics to advanced Geometry.  
Figure 4 demonstrates two different ways of thinking about the implications of this shift 
for the distribution of educational opportunity in California middle schools. The graphs in this 
figure look separately at course placement inequalities in schools with highly disadvantaged, 
moderately disadvantaged, and less disadvantaged student populations (defined via tertiles on the 
school socio-economic disadvantage scale.) The dashed lines in this figure represent temporal 
trends in the relative risk of enrolling in 8th grade Algebra or a more advanced course for non-
poor and poor California students. In all three panels, these lines show a downward trend, 
suggesting that poor students are moving toward equity in access to this college preparatory 
milestone. Poor students continue to be considerably less likely to enroll in advanced courses 
than non-poor students in relatively advantaged middle schools. However, the dashed line 
representing the state’s most disadvantaged middle schools dips below 1 in the middle of the 
time series, suggesting that poor students are more likely than non-poor students to enroll in 8th 





However, the solid lines, which represent temporal trends in non-poor and poor students’ 
relative risk of enrolling in their school’s highest 8th grade mathematics course, tell a different 
story. In relatively disadvantaged schools, where 8th grade geometry course enrollments are rare, 
the trends in inequality in access to Algebra or a more advanced course largely parallel trends in 
inequality in access to schools’ most advanced course. However, in relatively diverse “moderate 
disadvantage” schools as well as the more affluent “low disadvantage” schools, these trends 
diverge. By 2013, non-poor students are approximately three times more likely to enroll in the 
most advanced math courses offered in schools in both of these relatively advantaged school 
categories. Furthermore, this non-poor/poor gap in the opportunity to learn is growing rapidly in 
the state’s most advantaged schools, where geometry enrollments are also rising most rapidly. 
Taken together, these figures suggest that tracking up processes mitigated the opportunity-
equalizing consequences of the dramatic expansion of early Algebra in California schools, 
particularly in the state’s most socio-economically advantaged schools.  
FIGURE 4 AROUND HERE 
CONCLUSION 
Over the last several decades, middle and high schools across the United States 
substantially intensified curricula by enrolling a growing proportion of students in advanced 
classes once reserved for a relatively small college preparatory track. This movement has been 
particularly pronounced in California middle schools, where a state-led policy effort created both 
normative and accountability pressures to encourage schools to enroll more 8th graders in algebra 





perch to view the processes of organizational change associated with curricular intensification 
and their consequences for educational inequalities both within and between schools. 
Our analyses consider the ways in which California middle schools negotiated 
accountability, institutional, technical/functional, and internal political pressures during the 
Algebra-for-all era. Our findings suggest that each mattered. Schools across the state enrolled 
more students in 8th grade Algebra during the period in which the state ramped up accountability 
pressures associated with the course. Furthermore, we find that declines in school API scores are 
statistically significantly associated with small increases in 8th grade algebra enrollments. 
Although relatively few schools detracked middle school mathematics by enrolling virtually all 
students in 8th grade Algebra, schools that were particularly at risk for accountability sanctions 
were most likely to do so. These findings are consistent with Hypothesis 1, suggesting that 
accountability pressures played a role in the dramatic expansion of 8th grade Algebra that 
occurred between 2003 and 2013.  
However, consistent with the idea that normative and other institutional pressures also 
influenced school course placement practices, the expansion of 8th grade algebra enrollments was 
far more widespread than one might expect if accountability pressures were the only forces that 
influenced schools’ placement decisions. Indeed, while high-achieving schools faced few 
accountability pressures, we find that school prior achievement was strongly associated with 8th 
grade algebra enrollments during the study period (even though these schools tended to maintain 
tracked course sequences.) Further, consistent with Hypothesis 2, the fact that 8th grade algebra 
enrollment rates did not decline when the state’s Algebra-for-all effort relaxed suggests that 





institutionally isomorphic pressures that maintained the course’s central position in the states’ 
middle school mathematics curricula.  
But perhaps our most striking finding is that on average, California middle schools 
tracked up in the Algebra-for-all era. The state’s Algebra-for-all effort created few incentives for 
schools to enroll students in the doubly-advanced 8th grade geometry course. Indeed, many state 
educational leaders encouraged schools to detrack by enrolling high- and low-achieving students 
in 8th grade algebra courses together. However, we find that on average California schools 
expanded their mathematics curricula during the study period, enrolling a select group of 
students in doubly-advanced geometry courses. This approach was particularly prevalent in 
schools that educate advantaged student populations.  
Consistent with the technical/functional explanation and Hypothesis 3, we find a positive 
association between schools’ prior achievement levels and our tracking up measures. Further, we 
find that schools that enroll students at highly varying skills levels are less likely to pursue 
curricula intensification strategies and more likely to differentiate instruction. However, even 
after controlling for these trends, we find that highly socio-economically disadvantaged schools 
are more likely to pursue Algebra-for-all strategies and less likely to pursue tracking up 
strategies compared to more affluent schools. Consistent with Hypothesis 4 and prior research 
describing parental and educator opposition to detracking efforts, this finding suggests that 
affluent and high-achieving schools create new academic opportunities for elite students as they 
intensify curricula, rather than creating heterogeneous learning environments. 
 This “tracking up” phenomenon is likely one process through which inequalities are 





period, California schools dramatically broadened access to 8th grade Algebra, placing hundreds 
of thousands of the state’s middle school students on an accelerated mathematics track. Rather 
than corresponding with a decline in middle school mathematics curricular differentiation, we 
find that California’s Algebra-for-all movement coincided with the creation of a new, more 
highly differentiated curricular structure in middle school mathematics. The tracking up 
phenomenon meant that the top 10 percent of students qualifying for at least Algebra were 
placed in Geometry by the end of our study sample. Given finite instructional resources, the 
creation and expansion of 8th grade geometry courses may have redirected instructional resources 
from these 8th grade Algebra classes, undermining their effectiveness. Although our analyses do 
not speak directly to the consequences of this curricular change for the distribution of student 
achievement or other educational outcomes, prior analyses suggest that curricular intensification 
in one California school district corresponded with declines in achievement for students at the 
bottom and the middle of the test score distribution (Penner et al., 2015).  
Our findings thus point to important limitations to the effectiveness of policy efforts to 
equalize opportunities to learn in America’s highly unequal and very loosely-coupled public 
education system. American school tracking systems do change over time, in some cases quite 
dramatically. But in the California case at least, the accountability pressures that are typically 
associated with contemporary American education policy seem to account for only a fraction of 
that change. Furthermore, it is not clear that the changes to California’s middle school tracking 
system that we observe during the Algebra-for-all era translated into a more equitable 





Our findings are also relevant to a discussions about the extent to which curricular 
tracking is a technical/organizational adaptation to address the challenges associated with student 
heterogeneity or a practice that is more intrinsically linked to the production of social inequality. 
Our analysis of changing middle school mathematics course placement practices in California 
schools suggests that both approaches have descriptive power. Consistent with Hallinan’s (1994) 
treatment of tracking as a flexible (and thus potentially improvable) organizational practice, we 
find that California schools dramatically changed their middle school mathematics course 
placement systems during the Algebra-for-all period. At the same time, we also find evidence to 
suggest that in many schools a countervailing tendency to “track up” mitigated this movement’s 
potentially egalitarian consequences. This finding resonates with Oakes’s (1994) view of 
tracking as an inequality-producing mechanism, with an important qualification: The fact that the 
“tracking up” was particularly pronounced in relatively advantaged California middle schools 
suggests that pressures to produce inequality within schools may be particularly pronounced in 
relatively diverse and elite settings.  
Our results are thus consistent with the theories of maintained inequality. While policy-
makers and educational reformers often hope to narrow inequality by broadening access to once-
scarce educational opportunities, schools may face strong pressures to create new pathways for 
the maintenance of educational opportunities. Tracking up patterns in California middle schools 
during the Algebra-for-all era suggest that these pressures toward maintained inequality are most 
pronounced in schools that educate relatively advantaged student populations. In addition to 
illustrating a key mechanism through which inequality in maintained in periods of broadening 





phenomenon obviates the equity gains associated with curricular intensification, increasing 






Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics, 8th grade enrollments in California public schools, 2003-13.  
 
 Notes: California Department of Education (http://data1.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/) school-level panel data, weighted by 





Figure 1: Percent of 8th graders enrolled in Algebra or higher math course by school-level socio-
economic disadvantage scales in California middle schools, weighted by 8th grade enrollment.  
 
Notes: California Department of Education (http://data1.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/) school-level panel data, weighted by 
8th grade enrollment. Plot includes a random sample of half of schools that provide 8th grade math course enrollment 
data in study year. “Detracked” schools, represented as “+”, enroll 90 percent or more of students in the same level 
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Figure 2: Violin plot, distribution of 8th grade Algebra and Geometry enrollments in California 
schools, 2003-13.  
 
Notes: California Department of Education (http://data1.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/) school-level panel data, weighted by 
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Figure 3: Local polynomial bivariate plots, school 8th grade Geometry vs. 8th grade Algebra or 
higher enrollment rates, 2003, 2008, and 2013  
	
Notes: California Department of Education (http://data1.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/) school-level panel data, weighted by 



















Table 2: Multi-level regression coefficients, predictors of percent of 8th graders enrolled in Algebra or more 
advanced mathematics and Algebra-for-all detracking, California middle schools 2004-2013. 
  % enrolled in 8th grade 
Algebra or higher 
School enrolls more than 90% 
of 8th graders in Algebra 
  Model 1  Model 2 Model 1  Model 2 
Year (reference=2008)       
 2004 -13.699***  -2.166**  -0.047***  -0.015 
 2005 -7.912***  -0.397 -0.015  0.008 
 2006 -4.905***  -0.76 -0.012  -0.003 
 2007 -2.357***  -0.381 -0.015  -0.009 
 2009 3.419***  2.130*** 0.007  0.005 
 2010 6.097***  3.080*** -0.032**  -0.032**  
 2011 7.294***  2.443*** -0.048***  -0.035*** 
 2012 8.214***  2.487*** -0.063***  -0.045*** 
 2013 6.141***  -0.176 -0.093***  -0.066*** 
8th grade demographics (std)        
 Enrollment (ln) -1.449**  -0.946*** -0.064***  -0.044*** 
 Socio-economic disadvantage (std) 0.225  2.255*** 0.084***  0.062*** 
Algebra readiness (yn-1)        
 7th grade CST (std) 5.332***  4.683*** 0.063***  0.044*** 
 7th grade CST (std)2 0.331*  0.247 0.003  -0.001 
 7th grade CST variance (std) -0.627**  -0.553**  -0.004  -0.004 
Accountability status (yn-1)        
 API (school mean centered) --  -0.571*   --  -0.022*** 
Placement patterns (yn-1)        
 % 8th graders in Algebra or higher (std) --  22.731*** --  -0.035*   
 % 8th graders in Algebra or higher(std) 2 --  -1.204 --  0.104*** 
 Detracked Algebra-for-all school --  -2.584*** --  0.307*** 
Constant  63.758***  54.968*** 0.486***  0.328*** 
ICC(District)  0.37  0.03 0.12  0.00 
ICC(School)  0.17  0.10 0.21  0.09 
N(obs)  15,143  13,615 15,143  13,615 
N(schools)  1,524  1,524 1,524  1,524 
*p<0.05   **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
Notes: California Department of Education (http://data1.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/) school-level panel data. Model 





Table 3: Multi-level regression coefficients, predictors of 8th grade Geometry enrollment rate and 
school offered 8th grade Geometry course, California middle schools 2004-2013. 
 
Notes: California Department of Education (http://data1.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/) school-level panel data. Model 






Table 4: Multi-level regression coefficients, predictors of number different of 8th grade math 
courses and school offered 8th grade basic/remedial mathematics, California middle schools 
2004-2013. 
 
Notes: California Department of Education (http://data1.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/) school-level panel data. Model 






Figure 4: Non-poor/poor inequality in enrollment in school’s highest 8th grade mathematics 
course compared to inequality in 8th grade Algebra and Geometry enrollment California 8th 
graders for students in schools with high, moderate, and low levels of socioeconomic 
disadvantage, 2003-2013 
 
NOTE: California Department of Education (http://data1.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/) school-level panel data. Non/poor 
relative risk is calculated separately for each school observation as the proportion of non-poor students enrolled in 
focal courses divided by the proportion of poor students enrolled in focal courses. If a school enrolls 8th graders in 
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